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Between the ‘viewing’ and the ‘knowing’ there is a world of dialogue that exists, 
and it is within that gaze of the audience perpetually subject to the nature of time 
that the aesthetics of art comes alive
Special Feature
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The Indian Holi festival conjures 
up my past as a painter mixing 
paint from powder colour. Inert 
pigment has a special quality; it 
coats everything and makes the 
mundane colourful and gets 
everywhere. In my own painterly 
learning, I fix the powder colour 
to achieve permanence. I write 
from the ‘I’, the performative 
node of enquiry. Knowledge has 
no hierarchy and is unnaturally 
hinged upon a selfish and elite 
‘mystical’ academy that is not 
the only sort of knowledge.
 
I, the writer, come with a diferent 
knowledge, by degree, to the 
reader. My learning is from a 
working class beginning, my 
experiences, and from the 
academies I work with and teach 
through. It is not one thing or 
the other. You will cast your own 
knowledge over mine and it will 
connect in diferent ways; it may 
be discontinuous, alien, repulsive, 
warming. An audience is free-
willed and this is how it should be.  
On ‘The Audience’ the editor 
asks for a way forward and in 
response I have ‘brushed up’ 
on some key thinkers who have 
influenced my Habitus,1 where 
I stand or ‘see fit’ in the realm 
of audiences of creativity. This 
personal re-visitation is afected 
by new, and worldwide, 
contemporaries. An audience 
will never be the same twice; the 
nature of time prevents us from 
receiving the ‘same thing’ in the 
‘same way’. Time erodes and 
revitalises the ‘same thing’ if one 
chooses to re-visit ‘that thing’; 
like the Taj Mahal changing colour 
at diferent times of the day.
New political and religious 
enigmas grip our ‘new 
contemporary’. This newness 
makes thinkers such as Jacques 
Rancière, Jacques Lacan, Hal 
Foster and Pierre Bourdieu 
unique to my re-visitation. 
Rancière, in The Emancipated 
Spectator,2  states that ‘viewing 
is the opposite of knowing: the 
spectator is held before an 
appearance in a state of ignorance 
about the process of production 
of this appearance and about 
the reality it conceals.’ This fact, 
together with the idea of the 
spectator being passive and 
‘separated from both the capacity 
to know and the power to act’ 
is a ‘bad thing’.3  Rancière 
describes this as an ‘illness of 
the gaze’, a ‘theatrical mediation’, 
which ‘prepares the gaze for 
passivity and illusion.’4  On a 
‘media stage’ this prevails. What 
Rancière calls for is a type of 
looking that incorporates a 
community of ‘living attitudes’ 
of each of its members. My 
reflections on the nature of 
knowledge, and of the Holi 
festival, focus on communities 
of ‘living attitudes’ with 
individualised referents.
Rancière wants audiences to be 
active and fearless in challenging 
whatever is put before them. 
Rancière’s work, in this instance, 
draws me to the socio-
philosophical works of Pierre 
Bourdieu and Henri Bergson. 
Rancière speaks of two types 
of knowledge. The first is 
established by the establishment, 
the second is what we assume to 
know, and which we are unsure 
about. The former, intrinsically 
connected to the academies of 
knowledge, is wrongly assumed 
to be the guarantor of all 
knowledge. Knowledge, or the 
thirst for knowledge, comes 
from all angles.  Established 
knowledge, academia, is likely 
to make us feel inferior. Bergson 
promotes instinct above any 
other type of knowledge.
It is the impossible-to-measure 
gap between diferent types of 
knowledge that divides our 
knowledge. According to 
Bourdieu, it is the diference 
between academic discourse 
(sanctified knowledge) and 
other types of knowledge. For 
Rancière, wanting to know and 
not knowing is the only key to 
intelligence. The only entity 
knowledge has is ‘drive’. ‘… What 
is involved is linking what one 
knows with what one does not 
know.... Like researchers, artists 
construct the stages where the 
manifestation and efect of their 
skills are exhibited, rendered 
uncertain in the terms of the 
new idiom that conveys a new 
intellectual adventure.’5 
To begin this article, I visited 
Tate Gallery London where my 
plan was to eavesdrop on 
conversations of people looking 
at artworks. I wanted a diferent 
sort of knowledge about art, 
one that gave me information 
outside of theory and history 
gained from the academy.  
However, what happened was 
quite diferent; I began to see 
the galleries as forged from the 
minds of their curators. This 
highlighted curators as social 
mediators to the public viewing 
art. Audiences, like research, are 
about cross-referencing, 
evaluation and being surprised.
Hal Foster, art historian, begins 
his book, The Return of the 
Real 6  with Minimalism as 
going against the grain of the 
art establishment. He makes 
two important points: firstly 
that Minimalism breaks away 
from art history because of its 
theatricality; and secondly that 
interaction between the work 
- 60 - 61!∀#∃%&∀∋(()&%∃∗%+,∀−+.∀/∀0∗∃∀1234!∀#∃%&∀∋(()&%∃∗%+,∀−+.∀/∀0∗∃∀1234 !∀#∃%&!∀#∃%&
∋(
()
&%
∃∗
%<
9=
>∀
?
∗%
6+
+&
6∀
?
∗≅
&6
Α
∗=
- 62!∀#∃%&∀∋(()&%∃∗%+,∀−+.∀/∀0∗∃∀1234 - 63!∀#∃%&∀∋(()&%∃∗%+,∀−+.∀/∀0∗∃∀1234 !∀#∃%&!∀#∃%&
and the viewer completes the 
art of the Minimalist. Foster 
describes this as somewhere 
between architecture and 
memorial. Robert Morris’s 
interactive work, 
Bodymotionspacethings (1964), 
when shown at the London’s 
Tate Gallery was closed after a 
few days because it was wrecked 
and loved to bits by the public. 
From this moment art became 
more accessible, and like 
theatre, less elitist.
This ‘theatricalisation’ of art 
caught on. In 2011 the Hayward 
Gallery in London staged an 
exhibition called Move. 
Choreographing You!7  – 
a series of installations from 
significant episodes in art and 
dance history.  The public could 
climb, swing, dress up, dance 
and experience a play of forms 
and environments ranging from 
a gorilla suit to a simulated war 
zone and live-time delay video. 
The most striking thing about this 
exhibition was that it brought 
strangers together, where they 
conversed and exchanged 
experience and knowledge. It 
was participatory art as a useful 
expose of truth. Nicolas 
Bourriaud, curator and critic, 
brought to the forefront 
‘relational aesthetics’, where an 
artwork would, and always will 
be, subject to the points of 
reference within the viewer. 
Prior to all of this, Jacques Lacan 
laid out a concept of the gaze 
whereby we create an image-
screen, a form of our 
unconscious imagining of what 
we are looking at and experiencing. 
Lacan’s image- screen is the 
result of the gaze as it ‘screens 
off and on’, an oscillation 
between the viewer and artwork. 
It is what a viewer is compelled 
to see and not necessarily what 
the artist or curator wants us to 
see.  When going around an 
exhibition we are hooked 
according to what Roland Barthes 
called the punctum, the ‘thing’ 
that ‘strikes’ us immediately 
about a part, a fragment, of 
what we are looking at.
According to the artist and 
writer Victor Burgin, the ‘scopic 
drive is the only drive that must 
keep its objects at a distance…
(and that) the look puts out its 
exploratory, or aggressive 
“shoots” (in Lacan’s expression) 
but it equally clearly also takes 
in objects, from the physical 
space – just as it projects 
unconscious objects into the 
real.’8  This power of looking 
results in the power to exchange 
individually diverse references. 
What springs to mind is the 
moment that the British artist 
brothers, Dinos and Jake 
Chapman decided to buy 
watercolour paintings by Adolph 
Hitler. They purchased these, 
with a viewer’s eye, to paint 
rainbows on them. To these 
artists the images warranted 
an image screen, a projection 
of a rainbow. Nevertheless, the 
hidden horror of these works 
remains ‘unscreened’.
Lacan distinguishes between 
looking and gazing. In a scopic 
regime,9 where we can look at 
anything as a subjectivity, we 
read the object or encounter 
with an unconscious 
pre-existence, this is similar 
to language as fabrication and 
locality. The gaze, like language 
and the source material for 
theory, is situated in ‘the world’ 
and not in the academy. 
Therefore, in Lacanian thought, 
the subject exists from variable, 
not fixed, sets of signifiers. The 
subject is without a 
predetermined signification. 
What we look at 
is subject to the Gaze as 
predetermined sets of the 
signified in the process of 
objectification. ‘Newness’, seen 
by an audience, nourishes a new 
subjectivity. These types of 
knowledge potentials are 
contained in us, and are as 
individual as every snowdrop has 
a unique shape. This is why, 
when searching for something 
on the World Wide Web, we 
look for the nearest thing that 
conforms to our sensibility as 
thinkers, these become micro-
narratives (Jean Baudrillard). 
In art galleries we are at the 
whim and mercy of the metonymy 
of the curator. This is why a 
display at Tate London, called 
The Artists Studio, for example, 
can appear as a jumble, even 
though it is clearly not. Whatever 
the curator says, we nevertheless 
latch onto the nearest thing to 
our sensibilities. I once heard a 
viewer say to a friend upon 
entering a gallery, of the works 
of Cy Twombly: ‘Is this joke art?’. 
I am sure Twombly would have 
approved of this reaction.
Lacan said, ‘in the early 1960s 
that the subject is the subject of 
the signifier’.10  Therefore the 
relationship between the 
signifier and the signified is 
unstable, subject to an infinite 
number of meanings. These are 
taken to be in the realms of 
symbols or symbolic orders. 
This forms the imaginary, what 
audiences see via the gaze. The 
signified, the outcome of the 
signifier, is suspended in the 
individuality of the subject, like 
the British are subjects to the 
Queen of England. 
Knowledge is predicated on 
non-knowledge or the quest to 
find out. The unconscious 
sometimes betrays us in this 
as fear of that which is not 
understood. This can lead to a 
dismissal of diversity, contained in 
significations. Therefore, we must 
normalise diversity through actions and 
studies of audiences.
According to Bourdieu, the domain of 
the individual, the social standing or 
position, is called Habitus. To me this 
is a place to reside thoughts that 
contribute to our supposed or assumed 
‘standing in the world’. The fragile 
arrangement of Habitus produces a 
ping-pong efect between knowledge 
of diferent kinds. Too often the 
knowledge of the state or the 
academic institution habitually gains 
the upper ground. ‘The view of the 
academic milieu as ‘fair’ and 
competitive and supposedly charged 
with ‘pushing back the frontiers of 
knowledge’, and selecting ‘the best 
mind’ for the task, is the kind of 
common-sense orthodoxy Bourdieu’s 
sociological research and reflections 
aims to dispel.’11 
Bourdieu sets up a thesis whereby 
‘ham, egg and chips’ has a cultural 
value equal to say, ‘Hamlet’, and each 
should be curious about the other. 
Equal opportunity and social mobility 
arrive from Bourdieu’s thinking of 
‘establishment knowledge’ set against 
‘experiential knowledge’ of, say, a lift 
operator or rickshaw driver. 
Knowledge in terms of the latter is 
subconsciously absorbed and not 
given credit or formalised. These are 
merely diferent forms of Habitus, not 
set in fields of ancestral bindings and 
generations of people that are born to 
perpetuate hegemony. 
The spectacle of the everyday is akin 
to raw sewage; it is not pickled, boxed 
and packaged in the way that artists 
make a spectacle of the everyday. 
Intelligence is a working proposition, 
not intelligence per se.
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